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In this essay, we examine the assumptions underlying natural science, social science, and 
the humanities. More speciﬁcally, we suggest that social science in general and leisure 
science in particular be guided by a different set of assumptions than those guiding 
natural science and the humanities. Drawing on the Aristotelian idea of phronesis, 
we propose that value rationality more so than instrumental rationality guide social 
scientiﬁc inquiry, and that social science in general, and leisure science in particular, 
be viewed as a bridge between natural science and the humanities. 
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In The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom (1987) characterizes natural science, social 
science, and the humanities as the big three that rule the academic roost and determine 
what we consider knowledge to be. He goes on to suggest a pecking order led by natural 
science, with social science and the humanities squawking over who gets to perch on 
the second rung. According to Bloom, natural science knows what it is doing. It has its 
epistemological act together, and there is general agreement about how natural scientists 
should go about their work. The fruits of their labor have made us healthier, wealthier, and 
wiser, at least insofar as it comes to understanding how the physical world works and how 
to take advantage of that understanding in service of humankind. 
“But where natural science ends,” Bloom (1987) continues, “trouble begins. It ends at 
man, the one being outside of its purview, or to be exact, it ends at that part or aspect of 
man that is not body, whatever that may be” (p. 356). The problem, as Bloom sees it, is that 
while the body is the purview of natural science, studying that part of us that is not body 
is claimed by both social science and the humanities. The difference between them is that 
social science wants to believe human beings are predictable while the humanities say we 
are not. 
The result has been two continuous and ill-assorted strands of thought about man, 
one tending to treat him essentially as another of the brutes, without spirituality, 
soul, self, consciousness, or what have you; the other acting as though he is not 
an animal or does not have a body. (p. 358) 
Bloom winds down his assessment of the big three by observing that “while both social 
science and the humanities are more or less willingly awed by natural science, they have 
a mutual contempt for one another, the former looking down on the latter as unscientiﬁc, 
the latter regarding the former as philistine. They do not cooperate” (p. 357). This is 
unfortunate, Bloom concludes, because social science and the humanities “occupy much 
of the same ground” (p. 357). 
Our purpose in writing this essay is to explore this “same ground” occupied by social 
science and the humanities to see if we might be able to rid ourselves of any “mutual 
contempt” and replace it with a more constructive sentiment. We enter the discourse as 
three social scientists who feel caught in between the concreteness of natural science that 
addresses questions of what “is” and the ﬂuidity of the humanities that address questions 
of what “ought” to be (Schumacher, 1978). Ultimately, we want to better understand the 
differences among the “is,” “ought,” and “in between” so that we might better appreciate 
and value the scholarship carried out in the name of natural science, social science, the 
humanities, and, more particularly, in the name of leisure science. 
The Pretensions of Social Science 
Much has been written about social science’s attempt to emulate natural science. Indeed, 
Bloom traces this effort back to the Enlightenment when that part of us that is not body was 
ejected from nature and hence from natural science and natural philosophy. Social science 
picked up the challenge to assimilate our invisible selves into the new natural science and 
to treat the science of humankind as “the next rung in the ladder down from biology” 
(Bloom, 1987, p. 358). Meanwhile, the humanities have gone their separate ways in trying 
to understand our humanness. They have employed different methods and come to different 
conclusions as to why we humans act the way we do. “Neither challenged the champion, 
natural science,” Bloom contends. Rather, “social science tried humbly to ﬁnd a place at 
court, humanities proudly to set up shop next door” (p. 358). 
Social science’s adoption of the assumptions and methods of natural science has yielded 
mixed results (see Hemingway, 1990, for a critique of this attempt in leisure science). While 
certain of its branches, such as economics and psychology, have demonstrated modest 
predictive power, social science in general has not. The failure of social science to deliver the 
same cause and effect certitude about our invisible selves that natural science has delivered 
about our physical selves has generated mounting criticism of the underlying assumptions 
and methods governing the conduct of social science. Flyvbjerg (2001) summarizes the 
essence of this criticism in Making Social Science Matter, in which he discusses the failings 
of social science’s aping of natural science. He also considers social science’s promise if 
governed by a different set of assumptions leading to the employment of different methods 
of discovery and analysis to address scientiﬁc questions that are ill-suited for natural science. 
Essentially, Flyvbjerg reasons that social science will never be able to derive context-
independent theories that explain human behavior in the same way natural science has 
derived context-independent theories to explain the workings of the physical world. This is 
due, in part, to the self-reﬂexive nature of what social scientists study; that is, the objects 
of interest to social science are subjects with their own interpretations of themselves and 
events which are often inconsistent and highly contextualized. They defy generalization in 
the abstract. The upshot of Flyvbjerg’s analysis is that social science is doomed to second 
class citizenship as long as it insists on mimicking the assumptions and methods of natural 
science. Social science cannot deliver the cumulative epistemic understanding that natural 
science can because it is trying to come to grips with a fundamentally different subject 
matter. To compare the contributions of social science with natural science along epistemic 
lines is thus rendered futile, and if perpetuated without critical review, social science is 
bound to come up short. 
Flyvbjerg’s remedy for the misguided pretensions of social science is to adopt a 
new set of assumptions and methods for addressing questions that natural science is ill-
equipped to answer, questions that are based on value rationality rather than instrumental 
rationality. Value rationality and instrumental rationality can be thought of as different 
means-ends processes. Both types of rationality involve consciousness and planning; their 
main difference is that value rationality focuses on the value of the ends it seeks to reach, 
asking why an act is ultimately of value, and less on the means to get there or the questions 
of how to reach the end. Instrumental rationality, on the other hand, considers questions 
of how to reach an end but not so much why, or the value of the ends it seeks to reach. In 
Flyvbjerg’s view, value rationality means “the purpose of social science is not to develop 
theory, but to contribute to society’s practical rationality in elucidating where we are, where 
we want to go, and what is desirable according to a diverse set of interests” (2001, p. 167). 
Flyvbjerg legitimizes these questions as worthy of social scientiﬁc inquiry by anchoring 
them in Aristotle’s idea of phronesis. 
Phronesis 
Phronesis is a “true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are 
good or bad for man” (Aristotle, as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 2). Phronesis is practical 
wisdom involving judgments and decisions. Aristotle’s phronesis contributes to the “re­
ﬂexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an 
enlightened political, economic, and cultural development in any society, and which is at 
the core of phronesis” (Flyvbjerg, p. 3). To Aristotle, the “most important task of social 
and political studies was to develop society’s value rationality vis-a`-vis its scientiﬁc and 
technical rationality. Aristotle did not doubt that the ﬁrst type of rationality was the most 
important and ought to inﬂuence the second” (p. 53). As Flyvbjerg points out, however, 
since the Enlightenment phronesis has receded into the background as instrumental ratio­
nality has taken over as the dominant position informing science. What this means is that 
“is” questions have been addressed by science largely uninformed by “ought” questions. 
Stated differently, value questions have been deemed to be outside the purview of science. 
Bronowski’s (1965) Science and Human Values provides a clear illustration of where this 
can lead when he describes the building of the atomic bomb with little forethought given to 
the moral question associated with dropping it. When it comes to just who was responsible 
for the atomic bomb, Bronowski asks in the words of a popular dance tune of the day, 
“Is You Is, or Is You Ain’t Ma Baby?” (p. 11). Absent any value rationality-guided social 
science preceding the weapon’s development, a crucial phronetic question that should have 
been asked was not. 
This, then, is the role Flyvbjerg sees for social science. While natural science is strong 
in epistemic qualities, it is weak in phronetic qualities. And while social science is weak in 
epistemic qualities, it is strong in phronetic qualities. Their strengths and weaknesses lay 
along different dimensions, and rather than seeing natural and social science as competing 
with one another, they, along with the humanities, should be seen as striving to serve 
fundamentally different ends. 
Toward a More Phronetic Social Science 
What might a more phronetic social science look like? A brief review of Aristotle’s three 
important forms of intellectual work—episteme, techne, and phronesis—is illustrative. 
Episteme can be interpreted as the scientiﬁc ideal based on the promise of universal theories 
that explain the physical workings of the world. Techne can be interpreted as applied science, 
the practical application of technical knowledge. Phronesis can be interpreted as ethical 
deliberation about values related to praxis. They are all necessary to intellectual thought, 
and they all should be valued in their own right. But as long as social science continues to 
try to emulate natural science, episteme will likely be held up as the scientiﬁc ideal, and 
social science will continue to be evaluated in ways patterned after natural science. That, 
following Flyvbjerg’s logic, will be counterproductive to what social science can contribute 
in the way of phronetic insights about the workings of that part of us that is not body. 
From Flyvbjerg’s perspective, the kind of scholarship that matters in social science 
need not be theory-based or context-independent as required in natural science. Neither 
must it to lead to prediction and control. On the contrary, trying to satisfy the canons of 
natural scientiﬁc inquiry is bound to result in ongoing frustration for social scientists. What 
is needed instead is a revision of thought about what constitutes scholarship in social science 
that reﬂects the phronetic qualities inherent in the social scientiﬁc enterprise. What is needed 
is a new appreciation of the intellectual work that goes on in the name of social science that 
leads to a better understanding of how value rationality can inform instrumental rationality, 
so that in the end we might have a more satisfying answer to Bronowski’s question, “Is You 
Is or Is You Ain’t Ma Baby?” 
Flyvbjerg goes into great detail describing what good phronetic social science looks 
like. He holds up Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton’s (1985) Habits of the 
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life as a prime example of phronetic 
insight guided by variations of the three value rational questions that characterize the 
starting point for classic phronetic inquiry: “Where are we? Where do we want to go?” and 
“What is desirable?” As Flyvbjerg describes the book: 
Habits of the Heart . . . focuses on values, the authors get close to the people 
and phenomena they study, they focus on the minutiae and practices that make up 
the basic concerns of life, they make extensive use of case studies in context, they 
use narrative as expository technique, and, ﬁnally, their work is dialogical, that is, 
it allows for other voices than those of the authors, both in relation to the people 
they study and in relation to society at large. The whole point of the study is to 
enter into a dialogue with individuals and society and to assist them - after they 
have assisted the researchers - in reﬂecting on their values. The aim is to make 
moral debate part of public life. (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 63) 
Again employing Habits of the Heart as his exemplar, Flyvbjerg asserts that the goal of 
phronetic inquiry “is to produce input to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society, 
rather than to generate ultimate, unequivocally veriﬁed knowledge” (p. 139). Reinforcing 
this perspective, Bellah et al. (1985) express their hope that 
the reader will test what we say against his or her own experience, will argue with 
us when what we say does not ﬁt, and, best of all, will join the public discussion 
by offering interpretations superior to ours that can receive further discussion. 
(p. 307) 
Phronetic social science is thus grounded in praxis, and its aim is to improve praxis. The 
methods it employs focus on values, place power at the core of analysis, get close to 
reality, emphasize little things, look at practice before discourse, study cases and contexts, 
ask “how” as well as “why” employing narrative analysis, join agency and structure, and 
dialogue with a polyphony of voices (Flyvbjerg, pp. 129–140). From this perspective, “the 
purpose of social science is not to develop theory, but to contribute to society’s practical 
rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according 
to diverse sets of values and interests” (p. 167). Its aim is to move value rational deliberation 
to the forefront of social scientiﬁc thought and action and to apply phronetic insights to the 
resolution of real world problems (Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012). There is, then, a 
strong imperative for adopting an applied phronesis perspective in leisure science as well. 
Toward a More Phronetic Leisure Science 
In a provocative essay, Williams (in press) extends Flyvbjerg’s assessment of the promise of 
phronetic social science to the context of leisure. Williams begins by exploring the futility 
of employing traditional scientiﬁc approaches to seeking solutions to problems faced by 
leisure professionals in the ﬁeld because of the “fundamental differences between the nature 
of science, which seeks to transcend place, and the nature of practice, which is by necessity 
place-based.” In Williams’s view, the age-old science-practice gap is impossible to erase 
because traditional science seeks to identify context-independent principles upon which 
to base professional practice, whereas practice is always context bound. Science in the 
abstract tends not to acknowledge place-based idiosyncrasies, which weakens the utility 
of scientiﬁc generalizations when applied to speciﬁc managerial situations. Consequently, 
Williams, like Flyvbjerg, sees the need to adopt new ways of thinking about how to conduct 
leisure science if it is to better inform praxis. 
One of Williams’s main criticisms of leisure science as it has been traditionally con­
ducted is its top-down structure. Extrapolating from theory to practice, or what Williams 
refers to as taking a “god’s-eye” view of things, has not led to an integrated and cohesive 
body of knowledge to guide the work of leisure professionals in the ﬁeld. On the contrary, 
theory-based science often obfuscates rather than clariﬁes professional practice, and practi­
tioners who hunger for science-based managerial insights are routinely fed a diet of murky 
research results, concluding in effect, “It depends.” 
Williams’s remedy is to situate social science in the thick of professional practice 
rather than hovering above it. By embedding the research process in the places where the 
planning, implementation, and evaluation of leisure services unfold, social scientists stand 
to beneﬁt from the accumulated wisdom of practitioners while practitioners stand to beneﬁt 
from the systematic observations of social scientists. This position of “betweenness” is 
at the same time informed by top-down scientiﬁc reasoning while simultaneously being 
animated by bottom-up insights from practitioners whose knowledge is embedded in place 
(Entrikin, 1991). Leisure science thus becomes a collaborative exercise in collective sense-
making governed by value rationality (see Stewart, Parry, & Glover, 2008, for a similar 
interpretation). This is the stuff of Aristotle’s phronesis. It values local, practical knowledge 
situated in place as a foundation for developing informed action “guided by the collective 
wisdom of networked actors and institutions governing complex systems, each informing 
one another in a collaborative form of rationality that operates both horizontally [place to 
place] and vertically [upwards and downwards in scale]” (Williams). 
Toward a Broader Conception of Scholarship in Leisure Studies 
How, then, might we think about what constitutes scholarship in leisure studies? The 
differences between natural science, social science, and the humanities suggest a widening 
of categories of meaningful contributions. Indeed, leisure studies might better be thought 
of as a context for episteme, techne, and phronesis rather than as a particular form of 
intellectual work (i.e., episteme). Signiﬁcant inquiry is ongoing in leisure studies in all 
three realms. Natural scientists, guided by epistemic principles, examine leisure impacts on 
the physical world up to and including the human body (think of David Cole’s body of work 
on physical impacts associated with campground and campsite use); social scientists, guided 
by techne, apply research results to improve professional practice (think of John Crompton’s 
body of work on marketing and pricing of leisure services); and phronetic social scientists 
strive to make sense of the meanings and values that self-reﬂexive individuals ascribe to 
their leisure experiences (think of Karla Henderson’s body of work on women’s leisure). 
Meanwhile, philosophers, poets, novelists, musicians, ﬁlmmakers, and other representatives 
of the humanities contribute in their own ways to understanding the meaning of leisure in 
our lives. All of this work is important and worthy of consideration and support in higher 
education. 
In a recent review of related literature, Stewart et al. (2008) suggest that leisure 
scientists are gravitating away from a singular epistemic discourse to embrace a multiplicity 
of discourses to do justice to their subject matter(s). They underscore the signiﬁcance of 
hidden or unexamined values and ideologies that shape and guide leisure science, and they 
emphasize the importance of making those values and ideologies explicit in the research 
process. Stewart et al. also challenge the leisure research community to rise above the 
traditional epistemic perspective to take in a broader view, one that recognizes and honors 
a range of different ways of knowing and being. This does not require abandoning the 
canons of scientiﬁc inquiry, giving up on theorizing, stopping the search for context-
independent principles, or abandoning the idea of prediction and control as one goal of 
scientiﬁc inquiry. It does, however, require acknowledging the limits of the epistemic 
perspective and being open to other perspectives that invite leisure scholars to investigate 
more thoroughly the importance of context, the self-reﬂexive nature of human beings, and 
the impact of pluralistic views on the nature and meaning of life. 
Conclusion 
What we are calling for is a view of social science in general, and leisure science in 
particular, that bridges natural science and the humanities (Goodale, 1990). We think 
Aristotle’s phronesis provides that bridge. Moreover, we are also encouraging the leisure 
studies community to welcome the humanities into the fold. The kinds of intellectual work 
that shed light on the meaning of leisure in our lives are extremely wide-ranging, and when 
done well they all constitute good scholarship. 
As Bronowski (1965) reminds us, the distinction between art and science is less 
pronounced than we commonly think it to be. There is, or ought to be, a kindred spirit 
animating all three branches of knowledge. They are, after all, bonded by a mutual interest 
in making sense of the world. Social science and the humanities need not be contemptuous 
of one another, nor should they be in awe of natural science. Natural science, social science, 
and the humanities should celebrate what makes their respective branches of knowledge 
unique in addition to what unites them—a common concern for better understanding the 
world, not only for the sake of prediction and control but also for the sake of felicity and 
for the simple satisfaction that comes with knowing. 
Leisure studies, for its part, should honor and reward the intellectual work that is carried 
out in the name of episteme, techne, and phronesis, as well as the work that is carried out 
in the name of the humanities. Our community of scholars should reﬂect the multiplicity of 
ways we come to know and understand the world, and the measure of what we accomplish 
together should reside in the coherence of the stories we tell. 
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